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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 09-4469
                          
DEBORAH Y. WOOD, 
             Appellant
v.
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH; MICHAEL HRITZ
                            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court  No. 2-07-cv-00899
District Judge: The Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 17, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
Filed: September 23, 2010
                             
  OPINION
                             
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
In this employment discrimination and civil rights action, we are asked to
review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment against an employee whose
position was eliminated following a department-wide reduction in force.  The
2District Court held that the employee failed to come forth with evidence sufficient
to establish that she (1) suffered discrimination on the basis of gender, (2) was
subjected to a hostile work environment, (3) was the victim of unlawful workplace
retaliation, (4) was denied equal protection of the laws, and (5) was deprived of
her constitutional right to due process.  For the reasons set forth below, we will
affirm.
I.
Appellant Deborah Y. Wood was employed as a systems analyst in the
Systems Section of the University of Pittsburgh’s National Surgical Adjuvant
Breast & Bowel Project Biostatistical Center (“NSABP”).  Appellee Michael Hritz
was the supervisor of NSABP Systems Section personnel.  At the time Wood was
hired, the Section employed a total of six individuals; Wood was the Section’s sole
female and its only African American employee.
NSABP is a clinical trials group whose financial existence depends upon the
receipt of non-university grant funding.  In 2007, approximately ninety percent of
NSABP’s financing was provided by National Institute of Health grants.  When
Wood commenced her employment with NSABP, she was provided a retention
letter expressly stating that “the continuation of this position is contingent upon
the renewal of these [non-university grant] funds.”
3Wood testified that her first several years of employment were
unremarkable.  In 2005, however, she became convinced that someone was
tampering with her office computer.  Over the next several months, Wood
repeatedly advised Hritz that her computer had been remotely accessed by an
unknown user.  She also alleged that icons were removed from her computer; that
she “lost control” of both her mouse and keyboard; that the number “666”
appeared on her office calculator “thousands of times”; and that someone entered
her office without permission when she was not present.  Hritz responded to these
allegations by placing a lock on Wood’s office door, purchasing and installing
software to monitor the usage of Wood’s computer, reviewing logs to determine
whether Wood’s computer had been remotely accessed, and authorizing an
individual from the university’s Computing Services and Systems Development
Department (“CSSD”) to review network activity related to Wood’s computer. 
After months of investigating her complaints, Hritz concluded that Wood’s
computer was not the subject of any improper tampering.
Wood was not satisfied with this determination.  In June 2006, she
contacted the university’s Human Resources Department to convey her
dissatisfaction.  The Human Resources Department thereafter commenced an
investigation of its own.  In addition, Hritz, CSSD, and Dr. Joseph Costantino, the
director of NSABP, continued their investigative efforts throughout the summer of
42006.  The hard drive of Wood’s computer was reformatted, she was provided
with at least one new computer, and CSSD reviewed additional event logs tracking
the usage of Wood’s computer.  Hritz alone spent over 150 hours attempting to
uncover the source of Wood’s complaints.  In the end, each of these various
inquiries reached the same determination: nothing improper had transpired with
respect to Wood’s computer.
In November 2006, Wood contacted the campus police to report that
someone had broken into her locked office.  This allegation led to an investigation
by the university police department, as well as additional investigative measures
by Hritz, CSSD, and Costantino.  CSSD assigned Kevin Johnson, a senior
information security analyst, to conduct a forensic inspection of Wood’s hard
drive.  Johnson devoted over 200 hours to this inquiry, only to conclude that
Wood’s computer was not accessed improperly.  The university police likewise
unearthed no evidence of inappropriate or unlawful activity.  Wood nonetheless
considered these investigative efforts to be “inadequate.”  Consequently, she filed
a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on
December 19, 2006, alleging that she was the victim of gender discrimination.
In the spring of 2007, Costantino learned that the National Institute of
Health intended to reduce its funding of NSABP by over two million dollars.  He
therefore determined that a reduction in the NSABP employment rolls was
5necessary to maintain department productivity.  Costantino elected to terminate
department employees with the lowest job classifications.  Wood was one of
seventeen employees selected for discharge.  On June 28, 2007, Costantino
announced to the staff that a reduction in force was necessary and named those
employees whose positions would be terminated.  After his announcement,
however, Costantino offered Wood the opportunity to interview for a new position
in another section of NSABP.  Wood declined this offer, and on July 12, 2007, she
was formally discharged.
On the day of her formal discharge, Wood served the university with a
complaint asserting gender and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, et seq., section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons.
Stat. §§ 951, et seq.  The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and dismissed the racial discrimination claims because
they were not administratively exhausted before Wood initiated federal suit. 
Following a period of discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the university and Hritz on all remaining claims.  Wood timely appealed
the District Court’s summary judgment order and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
 Our analysis of gender discrimination claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations1
Act (“PHRA”) is identical to our analysis under Title VII.  Burgh v. Borough Council of
Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 2001).  Therefore, we do not separately address the PHRA
claim.
6
II.
We  “exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment and apply the same standard that the District Court should have
applied.”  Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146
(3d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if
the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  The facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable
inferences from the evidence must be drawn in her favor.  Conopco, Inc. v. United
States, 572 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2009).
III.
Wood alleges that appellees violated Title VII by (1) discriminating against
her on the basis of gender,  (2) fostering a hostile work environment, and1
(3) retaliating against her after she engaged in protected activity.  Wood offers no
 Wood’s brief contains passing references to her contention that she suffered2
discrimination on the basis of race.  The race discrimination claims were dismissed by the
District Court at the pleading stage, however, because Wood failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies.  Wood does not directly challenge the District Court’s dismissal order, nor does she
proffer any argument suggesting the order was erroneous.  As a result, she has waived the issue
for purposes of appeal.  See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 642 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that “it is
well settled that ‘a passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this
court’” (quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d
375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994))).
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direct evidence of gender discrimination,  so we must analyze her allegations2
under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973).  See, e.g., Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313,
318-19 (3d Cir. 2000).  McDonnell Douglas requires the plaintiff to shoulder the
initial burden to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.  If the plaintiff
meets this requirement, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for the employment action. 
Should the defendant satisfy its burden, the presumption of discriminatory action
is rebutted and the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s stated reasons
are pretextual.  See Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2007).
To make out a prima facie claim for employment discrimination, a Title VII
plaintiff must show (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for
the position in question, (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action,
and (4) the existence of circumstances which give rise to an inference of
prohibited discrimination.  See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
 After Wood’s position was eliminated, she was offered the opportunity to interview for3
a vacant position in another section of NSABP.  Wood declined this offer, which was then
extended to an employee named Jidong Zou.  Although Zou’s job classification was lower than
that held by Wood, it is undisputed that Zou was offered the position only after Wood turned it
down.  Therefore, Zou’s retention is not evidence of the fourth prima facie element.  
8
248, 253 (1981); Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797-98 (3d
Cir. 2003); Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 357 (3d Cir. 1999).  In
a reduction in force suit, a plaintiff satisfies the fourth element by demonstrating
that the employer retained similarly situated employees who were not within the
protected class.  See Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 249-50 (3d
Cir. 2002); In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 294-95 (3d Cir. 1997). 
There is no question that the first three prima facie requirements are satisfied
herein, but the record is devoid of evidence which satisfies the final element.  To
the contrary, it is undisputed that NASBP terminated seventeen employees with
the lowest job classifications.  Wood does not identify a single individual whose
job classification was equal or inferior to hers and who retained his or her
position.   In other words, there is no evidence that employees similarly situated to3
Wood were retained.  Her claim fails, then, for she cannot establish that the fact of
 Even if we were to conclude that Wood made out a prima facie case of discrimination,4
appellees have articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory purpose for her termination: namely,
NASBP’s budget was reduced and the department was required to trim the employment rolls. 
Wood offered no direct or circumstantial evidence to discredit this proffered reason, nor has she
adduced evidence suggesting that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause behind her discharge.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir.
1994). 
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her termination raises an inference of discriminatory animus.   See Pivirotto, 1914
F.3d at 352 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977), and explaining that “[t]he central focus of the inquiry . . . is always
whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Wood next argues that she was subjected to a hostile work environment.  To
make out a Title VII hostile work environment claim, an employee must show that
“(1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of [her] sex, (2) the
discrimination was pervasive and regular, (3) the discrimination detrimentally
affected the [employee], (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a
reasonable person of the same sex in that position, and (5) the existence of
respondeat superior liability.”  Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 643 (3d Cir.
2007) (quoting Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 2001))
(internal quotations marks omitted).  Wood argues that she suffered persistent
harassment which must have been the result of gender bias.  Specifically, she
10
claims that her computer was the recurrent object of tampering, that the
university’s investigation of her allegations was “insufficient,” and that Hritz and
her coworkers “acted differently” toward her and treated her with disrespect in
office meetings.  
The District Court held that Wood’s proffered evidence failed to establish
that she was the subject of intentional gender discrimination.  We agree. 
University employees went to extraordinary lengths to investigate Wood’s
tampering allegations and there is simply no evidence to suggest that any aspect of
their inquiry was influenced by gender bias.  Wood’s vague assertion that her
colleagues “acted differently” toward her and treated her with disrespect is
likewise insufficient to meet Title VII’s prima facie requirement.  See Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998) (explaining that Title
VII does not impose a “general civility code” upon workplace conduct).
Wood also contends that she was the victim of unlawful workplace
retaliation.  To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show
(1) that he or she engaged in protected activity, (2) that he or she was subjected to
an adverse action by the employer, and (3) the existence of a causal link between
the employee’s protected activity and the purportedly adverse action.  Marra v.
Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007). The District Court held that
Wood engaged in protected activity when she filed complaints with the EEOC,
 According to Wood, the reduction in NSABP’s workforce was devised specifically to5
“get rid of” her.  This explanation is entirely speculative and does not constitute direct or
circumstantial evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably disbelieve the university’s
articulated reasons, or upon which it could conclude that an invidious discriminatory reason was
more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the university’s action.  See Fuentes,
32 F.3d at 764.
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that Wood’s July 12, 2007 discharge constituted an adverse employment action,
and that the discharge was causally linked to her protected activity.  Although we
are not convinced that Wood has satisfied the third prima facie element, we agree
with the District Court’s determination that appellees effectively rebutted any
inference of discriminatory action.  The university produced undisputed evidence
that NSABP’s budget was reduced, which in turn necessitated a workforce
reduction.  What is more, Costantino selected positions for elimination by
pinpointing those employees with the lowest job classifications.  Wood was one
such employee.  Because she offers no evidence to rebut the university’s
legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale,  Wood’s retaliation claim is without5
merit.
Finally, Wood raises equal protection and due process claims pursuant to
§ 1983.  The showing required to prove a § 1983 gender discrimination claim is
identical to that required by Title VII, see Stewart v. Rutgers, 120 F.3d 426, 432
(3d Cir. 1997); Wood’s failure to make out a case of Title VII gender
discrimination is thus fatal to her action arising under the Equal Protection Clause. 
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The due process claim is likewise defective, for the safeguards of the Due Process
Clause “apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.”  Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of
Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 401 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Wood contends that
she was “entitled to have [her] claims of electronic harassment and interference
properly investigated,” and that the university failed to “enact proper policies
regulating incident and forensic investigations.”  However, Wood identifies no
statutory or regulatory requirement mandating that the university follow a given
set of investigative procedures.  Wood therefore has no constitutionally protected
life, liberty, or property interest in “proper” university investigative procedures.
For the reasons set forth above, the order of the District Court granting
summary judgment in favor of the appellees is affirmed.
